The doc that started all this: http://wikileaks.org/wiki/G-8_plurilateral_intellectual_property_trade_agreement_discussion_paper
The 133 Commitee was the key body that oversaw and agreed the mandate for the TRIPS negioations. It is (in)famously opaque. Counterfeiting was a key issue at this years World health Assembly, with a big push by Pharma and the US and EU to expand the definition to try to limit generic medicines. A resolution to this effect was attempted but failed.
*** Passed by: Riksdagsinformation (Mikael Landén) From: CN = Tomas Lindell / OU = EUU / O = Parliament CC: Purpose: Re. Questions to the EU-panel on the Commission mandate to negotiate ACTA Hello According to the EU-panel's Office, the mandate was an A-point at the EU-panel meeting on 4 April. The question, however, prompted no discussion. See Annex word document and protocols: http://www.riksdagen.se/webbnav/?nid=3751&doktyp=eunprot&rm=2007/08&bet=28&dok_id=GV0A28 The mandate to the Commission to open negotiations was given at the Council for Agriculture and Fisheries, 14 April 2008 where Eskil Erlandsson represented Sweden. See page 23 press release here: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/agricult/99883.pdf I have not been able to find the Commission's recommendation to the decision that was the basis for the approval of the Council. It is in this document that the legal basis should be reflected. In the case of a negotiating mandate for a trade agreement, it is likely to Article 133 of EC Treaty, which is the legal basis for the Commission's mandate. The document can be ordered from the Council via the link through the pressing the "N / A" link. : http://register.consilium.europa.eu/servlet/driver?lang=EN&typ=Advanced&cmsid=639&ff_COTE_DOCUMENT=7759%2F08&ff_COTE_DOSSIER_INST=&ff_TITRE=&ff_FT_TEXT=&ff_SOUS_COTE_MATIERE=&dd_DATE_DOCUMENT=&dd_DATE_REUNION=&dd_FT_DATE=&fc=REGAISEN&srm=25&md=100&ssf=&rc=1&nr=1&page=Detail Additional information from the Commission is found here. Link to the press release: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/october/tradoc_136517.pdf The Commission's faq. : http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/october/tradoc_136516.pdf Tomas Lindell EU-upplysningen Sveriges Riksdag 100 12 Stockholm Tel: 020-250 000 Fax: 08-786 59 27 eu-upplysningen@riksdagen.se www.eu-upplysningen.se ***
> Google Swinglish: > > Article 133 Committee > EC Treaty Article 133 provides that the Commission will submit > proposals to the Council on how the common trade policy should be > implemented. The Commission will be under the article of trade > negotiations in consultation with a special committee, the 133 > Committee, appointed by the Council to assist in this task. The 133 > Committee addresses issues such as trade relations with third > countries and the EU action in the World Trade Organization, WTO, > and > in other multilateral trade. 133 Committee normally meets every > Friday in Brussels. > Responsible departments: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/6712/a/50337
> >> Q: Why are you not pursuing this agreement through the G8, WTO, > >> WIPO > >> or other formal structure [like the European Parliament]? > >> > >> A: We feel that the approach of a free-standing agreement gives us > >> the most flexibility to pursue this project among interested > >> countries. We fully support the important work of the G8, WTO, and > >> WIPO, all of which touch on IPR enforcement. The membership and > >> priorities of those organizations simply are not the most conducive > >> to this kind of path breaking project. > >> > >> http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/intell_property/fs231007_en.htm
From: The EU Decision-Making Process in EC Trade Policy: The Three Internal Tensions RAFAEL LEAL-ARCAS Queen Mary, University of London A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE? GOVERNANCE AND POLICY-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, Astengo, F. & Neuwahl, N., eds., Vol. II, pp. 132-156, Collection "Etudes Europeennes", Chaire Jean Monnet, Universite de Montreal, 2004 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=604261 Excerpts/Quotes: The Amsterdam Treaty intended to extend the competence of the common commercial policy to the key issues of intellectual property and services -Article 133(5) of the Amsterdam Treaty-. This is a sensible acceptance by the Member States since they have recognized that a divided Europe is less likely to defend its interests in international negotiations. Unfortunately, Article 133 of the Amsterdam Treaty makes no definition of “commercial policy.” B. Control The issue of who controls the EC’s negotiating strategy or policy has caused serious problems in the past. Treaty provisions and established practice give the Commission the right of initiative in areas of EC competence. So the Commission makes proposals on negotiations and policy positions. These proposals are then discussed in the Article 133 Committee, which is the real power behind and decision-making center for the European Community’s commercial policy. The Article 133 Committee is a special committee appointed by the EC Council to assist the European Commission.l These proposals can also be discussed in the framework of COREPERli and finally adopted by the General Affairs Council.lii The EC Council decision, formally on a qualified majority, authorizes the European Commission to negotiate in consultation with the Article 133 Committee. This authorization is sometimes called a mandate. This Commission’s mandate to negotiate on behalf of the Member States in the WTO does not imply a transfer of competences, which remain with the Member States. Decision making in EC commercial policy is predominantly technocratic in nature. EC commercial policy is created by a technocratic core comprising the officials in the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Trade and national trade officials who compose the Article 133 Committee.lxv This lacks a democratic approach to policy-making although it has the advantage of being considerably efficient.lxvi The General Affairs Council provides nominal political and democratic legitimacy to the process. The concept of democratic deficit in EU decision making is well known and some efforts have been made to address the problem. In the area of commercial policy, difficulties are accentuated by the technical nature of the negotiations. National ministers reporting back to national legislatures tend to limit their comments to the objectives of policy. By doing so, effective scrutiny of the negotiations is lost. National parliaments also have difficulties following the detail of negotiations, and the fact that negotiations take place at two steps removed from national parliamentary control (one in Brussels in the framework of the Article 133 Committee, and the second in Geneva in the framework of the WTO) means that national politicians do not believe they can influence the outcome of negotiations. The result is that national legislatures tend not to undertake any effective scrutiny of EC commercial policy.lxviii The EC Council and the Commission have reached informal agreements with the European Parliament on consultation. However, the views of the Parliament are not sought until the Commission has reached a deal with the EU’s trading partners and it has been endorsed by the Article 133 Committee, if not the EC Council. Having said that, the chances of the EP having any impact on the substance of the agreement is almost non-existent. The assent of the EP is required when a commercial policy agreement has budgetary implications, when there are institutional implications for the EU and when policy areas are concerned in which the EP has co-decision rights with the EC Council. As co-decision making is slowly increasing,lxx this suggests that the EP may have to give its assent to more international commercial agreements.
